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Abstract: The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to 
rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if backward 
compatibility  can  help  moderate  this  process  of  rebuilding  an  installed  base.  Using  a  structural 
model of the US market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward compatibility lets 
incumbents transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to some extent but that it 
also reduces supply of new software. We also find that backward compatibility matters most shortly 
after the introduction of a new generation. Finally, we examine the tradeoff between technological 
progress and backward compatibility and find that backward compatibility matters less if there is a 
large technological leap between two generations. We subsequently use our results to assess the 
role of backward compatibility as a strategy to sustain a dominant market position. 
 
Keywords: backward compatibility, market dominance, network effects, two-sided markets 
JEL Classification: L15, L82, O33 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank participants at EARIE 2009, seminar participants at Universidad Carlos 
III Madrid, European Business School, EM Lyon, LMU Munich, TU Munich, and Albert Banal-Estanol, 
Mélisande  Cardona,  Sofronis  Clerides,  Thorsten  Grohsjean,  Mariana  Rösner,  Erik  Lehmann,  Tim 
Simcoe, Jan Tonon, Stefan Wagner and Martin Watzinger for helpful comments and discussions. We 
acknowledge financial support from Deutsche Telekom Foundation and Vodafone R&D.   2 
 
1. Introduction 
Network industries often tip to monopolistic structures within a single product generation (Arthur 
1989). The fact that users are attracted to technologies with a large installed base of users or a large 
supply  of  complementary  goods  tends  to  amplify  small  initial  advantages.  Moreover,  market 
dominance in network industries is remarkably stable even across generations, which suggests that 
providers of successful technologies can carry over some of their dominance to future generations. It 
has been argued that maintaining compatibility between the new and the old generation – backward 
compatibility  –  can  be  a  way  of  sustaining  persistent  dominance  (Shapiro  and  Varian  1999).  In 
markets with rapid technological progress in which we would otherwise expect significant turnover 
of  dominant  firms  and  their  technologies,  backward  compatibility  may  lead  to  starkly  different 
outcomes than in markets without. 
Our  paper  studies  if  backward  compatibility  by  the  market  leader  can  be  a  strategy  to  sustain 
dominance across generations. To address this, we address a number of questions about the nature 
and implications of backward compatibility in markets with indirect network effects: 
1.  How does backward compatibility influence demand and supply for a new product? 
2.  How does the effect of backward compatibility vary along the product life cycle? 
3.  Is the effect of backward compatibility affected by the level of technological progress? 
We  analyze  the  US  market  for  handheld  game  consoles,  which  is  well-suited  for  our  purposes 
because i) backward compatibility is possible, but not necessary in this market and ii) generational 
change can be identified clearly. Compared to home video consoles connected to a TV set, handheld 
consoles are especially interesting as they exhibit different degrees of technological change across 
generations,  so  we  can  analyze  the  tradeoff  between  backward  compatibility  and  technological 
progress in the context of potential entry. We do not know of any prior work dealing with the 
market for handheld game consoles, although indirect network effects have been identified in the 
market  for  home  video  game  consoles:  existing  work  deals  with  asymmetric  network  effects 
(Shankar and Bayus 2003), changes of indirect network effects over the product life cycle (Clements 
and  Ohashi  2005),  software  exclusivity  (Corts  and  Lederman  2009)  and  blockbuster  software 
(Stremersch and Binken 2009). Although these papers handle multiple console generations, they do 
not explore how backward compatibility affects generational change and market dominance. One 
exception is Clements and Ohashi (2005), who address backward compatibility simply by adding the 
available games of the Playstation 1 to those of the Playstation 2.  3 
 
The theoretical literature on cross-generational or “vertical” compatibility (Katz and Shapiro 1994) 
analyzes firm incentives to choose backward compatibility. Waldman (1993) and Choi (1994) find 
that  price  discrimination  increases  compatibility  incentives,  while  Kende  (1994)  argues  that 
backward compatibility becomes more likely as valuations for old and new technologies are similar 
and building an installed base of new complementary products is expensive. Kende’s (1994) results 
are confirmed in a simulation model by Lee et al. (2003), who find that low valuation for backward 
compatibility  and  a  small  installed  base  advantage  of  the  old  generation  render  backward 
compatibility less likely. The welfare implications of backward compatibility are ambiguous, although 
Nahm (2008) finds that profits for the incumbent are generally higher with backward compatibility, 
which may increase its incentives to upgrade beyond the social optimum (Ellison and Fudenberg 
2000). Taking a demand perspective, Shy (1996) also finds that backward compatibility increases the 
frequency of new technology adoption. 
The sparse empirical literature on cross-generational compatibility finds that backward compatibility 
helps carry over some installed base advantage to future generations. Liikanen et al. (2004) and 
Koski  and  Kretschmer  (2005)  analyze  intergenerational  effects  between  the  first  and  second 
generations  of  mobile  telephony  and  confirm  the  positive  impact  of  backward  compatibility. 
Greenstein (1993) studies the market for mainframe computer systems and finds that buyers are 
more likely to select a new mainframe if they own a compatible predecessor system. Gandal et al. 
(2000)  study  the  launch  of  the  CD  and  run  a  counterfactual  analysis  by  assuming  backward 
compatibility of the CD with vinyl and find that this would have accelerated diffusion by 1.5 years. 
Our work also relates to the literature on entry deterrence, as backward compatibility can serve to 
discourage  firms  from  entering  a  market  or  at  least  prevent  them  from  attaining  large  market 
shares. However, while there are many theoretical models of strategic entry deterrence (Dixit 1980, 
Klemperer 1987, Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Salop 1979, Haan 2003), empirical studies of entry 
deterrence are rare in industrial organization (Schmalensee 1978, Smiley 1988). In the management 
literature, studies have focused on limit pricing (Srinivasan 1991), reputation (Clark and Montgomery 
1998) and excess capacity (Harrigan 1981), while Gruca and Sudharshan (1995) integrate a wide 
variety of entry deterrence strategies in their conceptual framework, in part referring to product 
portfolio choices (brand proliferation, preannouncement, switching costs). However, technological 
parameters  are  not  typically  considered  potential  instruments  for  entry  deterrence.
1  This  is 
surprising as in technology -intensive industries entry is a salient phenomenon, often replacing 
                                                            
1 An exception is Church and Gandal (1996), who study compatibility as a means of entry deterrence in a 
theoretical model.  4 
 
current leaders in the process of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942). The market for handheld 
consoles presents an interesting case study as entrants faced a backward compatible incumbent 
technology, and we are interested in studying if this strategy indeed helped the incumbent stabilize 
market dominance across several generations. 
We estimate demand for handheld video consoles as well as supply of game titles. Our estimation 
strategy builds on Clements and Ohashi (2005), extending their approach to account for backward 
compatibility, console age and the level of technological progress from one generation to the next. 
Further,  we  identify  console  characteristics  to  allow  for  a  meaningful  comparison  between  the 
effects of backward compatibility and increased console performance. In line with prior literature, 
we find that backward compatibility positively affects demand for a new generation. In addition, we 
find that: i) backward compatibility works through the installed base of software of the compatible 
parent generation, ii) it matters most shortly after product launch and iii) backward compatibility 
matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. Finally, analyzing the 
impact of backward compatibility on the supply of new software, we find a substitutive effect. 
We disentangle a (demand-enhancing) direct and a (demand-reducing) indirect effect of backward 
compatibility. The demand-increasing effect directly influences the adoption decision through the 
installed  base  of  software  for  the  compatible  parent  generations.  This  effect  weakens  over  the 
product life cycle and for higher technological leaps between generations. The demand-reducing 
effect works indirectly as old software partly substitutes for new software and thus lowers new 
software demand, leading to reduced software supply, which in turn decreases hardware demand. 
The demand-enhancing effect outweighs the demand-reducing effect so that backward compatibility 
helps  transfer  network  effects  across  generations.  Indeed,  we  show  that  the  market  leader, 
Nintendo, was able to maintain its market dominance across multiple generations through a strategy 
of backward compatibility. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the US market for 
handheld  game  consoles.  Section  3  develops  theory  and  hypotheses,  which  are  tested  using  a 
structural model of hardware demand in section 4. Section 5 discusses the estimation results, and 
we analyze the effectiveness of backward compatibility as an entry barrier in section 6 by performing 
a counterfactual entry experiment and considering alternative explanations. Section 7 concludes. 5 
 
2. Industry background 
The market for handheld game consoles first took off with the appearance of Nintendo’s Game Boy 
in 1989, the first device to sell to the mass market (Forster 2005). Handheld game consoles are – just 
as their (immobile) home video game counterparts – part of a system comprising both hard- and 
software. Hardware manufacturers supply consoles and often also software titles,
2 while software 
providers concentrate on the development and distribution of games. Given indirect network effects 
(Clements and Ohashi 2005) , hardware suppliers have an interest to encourage development of 
complementary products, namely game titles. Ever after the “Atari shock” in the early 1980s (when 
the game console market collapsed due to a sharp increase in poor game titles), hardware suppliers 
actively manage quality of the market’s software side: developers need to sign detailed licensing 
contracts which are then enforced by legal and technological means such as security chips (Genakos 
2001). This also prevents any hardware manufacturer from developing consoles that are compatible 
with games for other platforms. 
Our  sample  ranges  from  1995  to  2007
3.  Industry  observers  typically  separate  consoles  in to 
generations. In industry terminology, we study generations IV to VII (Forster 2005). 
Table 1 provides an overview of the consoles in the generations we study. It is striking that Nintendo 
–  from  IV  up  to  VII  –  was  continuously  present  in  the  market  while  its  competitors  changed 
continuously. Figure 1 illustrates Nintendo’s market share dominance over the whole period. We 
now describe the competitive landscape over the four technology generations we cover. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
Generation IV comprised Nintendo’s Game Boy and Game Boy Pocket, and Sega’s Game Gear. At the 
start of our sample in 1995, these consoles had already been on the market for some time. The 
                                                            
2 On average, hardware manufacturers produced 12.8% of game titles for their consoles. 
3 Extending the study period beyond 2007 would be problematic as smartphones (with Apple’s iPhone as the 
most prominent representative) have since then developed to be close substitutes to dedicated handheld 
game consoles. 6 
 
devices  basically  shared  the  market,  with  Nintendo’s  share  ranging  between  60%  and  80%  and 
Sega’s moving between 20% and 40% accordingly. 
The generation V console Game Boy Pocket reached market shares exceeding 80% from 1998 on. 
This is remarkable considering that: i) the device was basically a remake with a smaller body but the 
same hardware capabilities as its predecessor, the Game Boy, and ii) Tiger Electronic’s Game.com, 
which had superior hardware capabilities, had also been launched in the meantime. Nintendo’s 
Virtual Boy – in contrast to the company’s other products – was comparably unsuccessful due to its 
bulkiness, problems during use
4 and little software available. It could only reach substantial market 
share through a harsh price cut aimed at  reducing stockpiles.
5 The Game.com Pocket Pro, a lighter 
and less bulky remake of the Game.com, did not even reach 1% market share. 
The next dominant device was Nintendo’s Game Boy Color, which again was not the technically most 
advanced console of its time. Its main differentiating feature was the enormous installed base of 
backward compatible software titles from its predecessors. While its competitors did not have an 
installed base of existing games, the Game Boy Color could build on millions of software copies sold 
in the almost ten years the Game Boy platform had been on the market. Game Boy Color users did 
not have to wait for availability of new games and could buy or swap used games straight away. 
The next generation (VI) started with the Game Boy Advance. The device, which featured improved 
hardware power on the one hand and backward compatibility to Game Boy Color games on the 
other reached market shares close to 100% at the top of its cycle. Admittedly, there was no device 
on the market at that time matching the Game Boy Advance in terms of hardware power, but 
attributing its dominance merely to weak competition would be simplistic. Backward compatibility 
allowed users to draw on a game library comprising more than 46 million Game Boy Color titles right 
from the outset, which clearly played a role in its success. 
In early 2003 Nintendo launched the Game Boy Advance SP, a facelifted Game Boy Advance with 
identical technical capabilities but a new body design and minor screen improvements. It matched 
the success of its predecessor, completely dominating the market at the top of its cycle. It prevailed 
not only over dated devices like the Neo Geo Pocket Color but also over Nokia’s N-Gage, which had a 
processor more than 6 times faster than the Game Boy Advance SP. 
                                                            
4 Nintendo Virtual Boy’s image generation was based on a combination of a LED unit and oscillating mirrors. 
So, users had to focus on these mirrors while playing which caused many players headaches. This led to the 
Virtual Boy bearing a warning statement that its use causes headaches right from the start of retail availability 
in the United States (Kent 2002, pp. 513-515). 
5 The maximum market share reached by the  Virtual Boy was 44%, reached after cutting the initial price of 
more than $160 to less than $30 in April 1997. 7 
 
At the end of 2004 Nintendo launched generation VII of handheld game consoles. Compared to the 
last generation, the Nintendo DS was a significant improvement in terms of hardware performance. 
The  device  was  again  backward  compatible  and  could  play  Nintendo’s  generation  VI  games. 
However, in this generation Nintendo shared the market with  Sony. Sony’s Playstation Portable 
(PSP) started with a market share exceeding 50% and then ranging between 20% and 40%. This is 
remarkable considering that Sony had to start from scratch in the business while Nintendo again had 
a  strong  installed  base  of  games.  The  PSP  was  the  most  powerful  handheld  console  ever  and 
outperformed the DS by far – for example, it was nearly five times as fast as Nintendo’s DS. At the 
end of our study period both players Nintendo and Sony launched remakes of their generation VII 
consoles: the DS Lite and the Playstation Portable Slim. Both are lighter and possess a smaller body 
than their predecessors. 
Throughout the generations we study, Nintendo was successful, except with the Virtual Boy. At least 
part of its success may be due to the enormous installed bases of games that were leveraged by the 
company through backward compatibility. Sony’s success suggests that such dominance may be 
overcome  by  significant  technological  progress.  While  many  companies  failed  in  challenging 
Nintendo with consoles roughly on par, Sony’s Playstation Portable, which outperformed Nintendo’s 
DS by far, gained substantial market share quickly.
6 
3. Hypotheses 
We  now  derive  hypotheses  on  the  effect  of  backward  compatibility  on  hardware  demand  and 
software supply. We first discuss how backward compatibility works directly and indirectly. Second, 
we focus on the changing importance of backward compatibility over time. Finally, we discuss why 
we  expect  backward  compatibility  to  be  less  effective  for  larger  technological  leaps.  For  all 
hypotheses,  we  consider  how  backward  compatibility  influences  demand  for  handheld  game 
consoles and then turn to the impact of backward compatibility on games supply. 
3.1.  Influence of backward compatibility on demand and supply 
When  an  incumbent  launches  a  technologically  improved  product  generation,  it  usually  faces 
competition  from  two  directions:  from  the  incumbent’s  parent  generation  and  from  products 
offered by competing firms. The larger the incumbent’s installed base and the more fragmented the 
new generation, the more difficult it is to overcome this startup problem, causing excess inertia 
(Farrell and Saloner 1985, Kretschmer 2008) or technological lockout (Schilling 2002). In markets 
                                                            
6 Note that in this industry, success is typically measured in terms of market share.  8 
 
with indirect network effects, firms face a chicken-and-egg problem: it is not enough to offer a new 
video console; consumers also expect to choose from a wide variety of games for it. 
Gandal et al. (2000) identify three strategies for markets with indirect network effects to overcome 
startup problems. Firms can (1) subsidize hardware, (2) increase software availability by forward 
integration, and (3) make the product backward compatible with the parent generation. All three 
strategies are used in the videogame market. Especially shortly after product launch, consoles are 
often sold at or below marginal costs. Most console manufacturers also develop and publish games 
on their own to increase availability of software for their own consoles (Corts and Lederman 2009). 
The strategy we focus on in this paper is the use of backward compatibility to transfer network 
effects across generations, also widely used in the video games industry. 
In the market for handheld game consoles, backward compatibility implies that game cartridges of 
the parent generation can still be used with the new console generation. If the physical format of the 
game cartridges changes, this may even require a second cartridge slot
7. Backward compatibility 
therefore comes at a price for the console manufacturer: the enclosure has to be bigger, additional 
parts are needed, and the processor has to be able to process the old games. 
How will backward compatibility work exactly? Indirect network effects in the videogame i ndustry 
have so far been measured through the demand-increasing effect by the number of games currently 
offered on the market  (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009) . One way to assess 
the effect of backward compatibility could be to analyze in how  far the number of games for the 
compatible  parent  generation  still  on  the  market influence  demand  for  the  new  generation. 
However, it is unlikely that  consumers who bought a new game console  would still buy games for 
the parent generation. Instead, backward compatibility  may work  through  the installed base of 
games for the prior generation. This captures all  games previously sold that  potentially could be 
used with the new console. A larger installed base of compatible games increases the likelihood that 
a potential adopter has access to some of these games and can benefit from backward compatibility. 
A person has access to old games if she owns the parent console , or she could get old games from 
friends or through second-hand trading
8. 
A large installed base of old games gives more potenti al adopters access to these old games. If a 
potential adopter has access to old games, her benefit of adopting a new console increases as she 
                                                            
7 This was the case for the Game Boy Advance, which had one slot for old Game Boy Color cartridges and one 
for new Game Boy Advance ones. 
8There is a sizable second-hand market for console games. E.g., on eBay.com, as of September 30
th 2009, a 
total of 25,793 used games for mobile devices are offered. 9 
 
can play these games on the new console, which in turn increases demand for the new console. This 
leads to the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis D.1:   Backward  compatibility  increases  hardware  demand  more,  the  higher  the  prior 
generation’s installed base of software. 
We also consider the impact of backward compatibility on the supply of software titles. Prior work 
has focused on the hardware installed base of the current generation as the main driver affecting 
software variety (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009). We extend this by including 
backward compatibility as an additional factor. Following Hypothesis D.1, the logic of how backward 
compatibility should influence software supply is straightforward:
9 if consumers use old games of 
the compatible parent generation, demand for games decreases. Decreased demand for software 
lowers incentives to develop a new game, leading to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis S.1: Backward compatibility decreases supply of software titles for the new generation 
more, the higher the prior generation’s installed base of software. 
Combining  the  implications  of  Hypotheses  D.1  and  S.1,  we  expect  two  countervailing  effects 
affecting  hardware  demand.  First,  the  direct  effect  of  backward  compatibility  suggests  that 
availability of games for the compatible parent generation serves as a (part-)substitute for variety of 
new games, increasing  hardware demand. Second, the indirect effect of backward compatibility 
implies that the substitution of new games by old games reduces new software demand, which in 
turn lowers software supply, which eventually reduces hardware demand. 
3.2.  Importance of backward compatibility over time 
As discussed, backward compatibility may help solve the startup problem in network markets. The 
startup  phase  is  usually  characterized  by  a  low  number  of  available  game  titles  for  the  new 
generation. The availability of a parent generation’s installed base of compatible games can to a 
certain  extent  moderate  the  necessity  of  having  a  large  variety  of  new  game  titles  available. 
However, users are expected to strictly prefer game titles designed for the new generation over 
previous-generation titles as new games (unlike old ones) make full use of the technical features of 
the new console. Therefore, as more titles for the new console become available, consumers will 
buy the console for its supply of new games rather than for the existence of a large installed base of 
outdated games. This is summarized in our second hypothesis. 
                                                            
9 Indeed, for the following hypotheses, the predictions for the impact of backward compatibility on software 
supply are always opposite to the ones on hardware demand. 10 
 
Hypothesis D.2:   The demand-increasing effect of backward compatibility declines over time.  
Analogous to Hypotheses D.1 and S.1, we expect the effect of backward compatibility on software 
supply  to  be  the  opposite  to  hardware  demand.  We  therefore  expect  the  substitutive  effect 
between old and new games to decline over time, leading to increased software availability. 
Hypothesis S.2: The supply-decreasing effect of backward compatibility declines over time. 
3.3.  Backward compatibility and technological progress 
Our final pair of hypotheses addresses the potential tradeoff between backward compatibility and 
technological progress. Shapiro and Varian (1999) identify this as the tradeoff between “evolution” 
(which  ensures  backward  compatibility  but  offers  limited  technological  improvement)  and 
“revolution”  (sacrificing  backward  compatibility,  but  offering  drastically  increased  performance) 
strategies.  Shapiro  and  Varian  (1999)  conceptualize  these  as  dichotomous  decisions  based  on 
technological restrictions, but our empirical setting lets us identify the relative importance of both 
technological improvement and backward compatibility if both are present.  
We expect the two to be substitutes for consumers. That is, the degree of substitutability of old and 
new  games  depends  on  the  relative  performance  of  the  two  game  generations,  backward 
compatibility  and  new-generation  performance.  As  a  large  technological  improvement  on  the 
hardware side permits the design of better (i.e. more elaborately programmed) games, an old game 
will  be  a  worse  substitute  as  the  technological  frontier  is  pushed  out,  leading  us  to  our  last 
hypothesis on hardware demand. 
Hypothesis D.3:   The higher technological progress between two generations, the lower the demand-
increasing effect of backward compatibility. 
Again, we expect the effect of backward compatibility on software supply to run counter to that on 
hardware demand, which gives our final hypothesis on software supply. 
Hypothesis S.3: The higher technological progress between two generations, the lower the supply-
decreasing effect of backward compatibility. 11 
 
4. Data and Estimation Model 
4.1.  Data 
Data Sources 
The core data set for our analysis comes from the market research firm NPD Group and consists of 
monthly unit sales and revenues in the market for handheld game consoles in the U.S. for the period 
from 1/1995 to 11/2007
10. While, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the data 
about handheld game console, NPD data on video consoles has already been used for several other 
studies (Shankar and Bayus 2003, Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 2009, Stremersch 
and Binken 2009).  
Data on games for the different platforms is also supplied by NPD Group. The software data consists 
of monthly  unit  sales and revenue data for all available game titles. For each game   title, the 
associated platform is reported. Note that game data is assigned on a platform (not console) level. 
We define a platform by a common game format. A platform can consist of  a single console (as for 
the Game Boy Color) or of a family of consoles (as for the Game Boy and Game Boy Pocket) that use 
the same game format but are distinct regarding their hardware sales
11. 
Data on technical characteristics of the different consoles are also matched to our data. We use two 
variables representing the key dimensions that influence user perception: CPU speed as a proxy for 
processing power of the console and weight as a proxy for the console’s mobility. The major data 
source  for  these  technical  characteristics  is  Forster  (2005,  pp.  212-214).  This  is  completed  with 
specifications from suppliers’ websites, console databases and console information websites. 
All prices are deflated to enable comparison of console and game prices over the entire period. We 
use the US deflator provided by the International Monetary Fund.
12 We use monthly population 
estimates from the US census bureau  to proxy for  market potential. Finally, we  use USD-JPY 
exchange rates from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service
13 for a price instrument discussed later. 
                                                            
10 We include hardware-only sales, i.e. just the console, and packages comprising a console and a game. Both 
are treated equally in the analysis as (i) package prices do not differ significantly from that of single consoles 
and (ii) a clear separation is not possible with our data. Moreover, many consoles are rarely sold on their own. 
11 The other platforms consisting of two consoles are Game Boy Advance and Game Boy Advance SP, Nintendo 
DS and Nintendo DS Lite, game.com and game.com Pocket Pro, N-Gage and N-Gage QD, as well as Playstation 
Portable and Playstation Portable Slim. There are no platforms with three or more consoles in our data set. 
12 Data was retrieved from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database. 
13 Available at http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/. 12 
 
Variables 
The variables are described in Table 2 and Table 3 reports summary statistics. In line with Corts and 
Lederman (2009), we eliminate the influence from outdated consoles selling remainders or products 




INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
Market shares in the market for handheld game consoles ???|? ? =1 are directly calculated by dividing 
the monthly unit sales of console ? by the total units sold in a given month. To derive ??? and ?0?, we 
have  to  define  potential  market  size  first.  Unlike  Clements  and  Ohashi  (2005),  who  use  the  TV 
households to determine the number of potential buyers, we use the US population numbers as 
several people in a household can own handheld consoles and handheld use is independent of TV 
ownership. From this, we derive ???, which is a console’s market share of the market potential
15 and 
?0?, the market share of the outside good, i.e. the share of potential consumers that do not have a 
console and do not buy one in the given time period. By cumulating the unit sales data of hardware 
sales, we also derive each platform’s hardware installed base ??𝑔?
?𝑊16, 17. Finally, we divide revenue 
by units to calculate each console’s average monthly price 𝑝??. All prices are reported in 1995 USD. 
Software variety ?𝑔? is taken from the NPD data. For every platform we count the number of game 
titles with positive sales to obtain ?𝑔?. Therefore, ?𝑔? can decline over time if game titles are no 
                                                            
14 The mean monthly total number of units sold is 627,068. 
15 The market potential is defined as the size of the population minus the number of people  who already 
bought a handheld console. 
16 We do not depreciate the installed base as (absolute) console performance does not deteriorate over time. 
17 At the start of our dataset (1/1995), Nintendo’s Game Boy and Sega’s Game Gear have had already been on 
the market since 8/1998 and 1/1991. We therefore use data from http://vgchartz.com to derive the initial 
installed base of 12.7 respectively 2.9 million units for the Game Boy and the Game Gear. Data is derived by 
weighing the lifetime sales for Americas with the consoles’ 1995 US share from total Americas sales. 13 
 




The last set of variables concerns the hardware characteristics of the handheld consoles. The dataset 
covers the period from 1995 to  2007 in which technological progress for handheld game consoles 
was remarkable. For example, the mean CPU speed of active consoles had grown from 3.93 MHz in 
01/1995 to 187.43  MHz in 12/2007. As the data  covers the entire  period this causes problems in 
comparing devices’ capabilities. Comparing a 2007 console that is technically below average to the 
best device from 1995 would make the first one look far too good. We therefore normalize all 
variables containing technical data by the characteristics of contemporaneously active consoles. This 
is  done  by  calculating  yearly  mean  values  and  standard  deviations  for  CPU  speed  and  console 
weight. The yearly mean values and standard deviations obtained were then used to construct a z-
score for each console. Finally, ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈  is derived as the percentage improvement of the CPU 
speed compared to the CPU speed of the compatible parent generation.
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4.2.  Model specification 
We  estimate  both  hardware  demand  and  software  supply.  In  line  with  prior  work  on  indirect 
network  effects,  we  use  a  structural  model  to  estimate  hardware  demand  and  a  reduced-form 
model to estimate software supply (Nair et al. 2004, Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts and Lederman 
2009). The two estimation models are derived below. 
Hardware demand 
We model the demand side of the market using a structural model for hardware demand. Our model 
extends the discrete-choice model for differentiated products used by Clements and Ohashi (2005) 
and Corts and Lederman (2009) with measures of backward compatibility. We assume that each 
potential adopter ? of handheld video consoles maximizes its utility by choosing the highest ???? 
where ? ≠ 0 represents the different handheld consoles and ? = 0 represents the outside option of 
not buying a console. The consumer’s utility function has the following (additive) functional form: 
  ???? = ???? + ?𝑝?? + 𝜔?𝑔? + 𝜉?? + ???? + 
            + ?1??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 + ?2??? + ?3  ??? ∗ ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊   + 
            +?4??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1 + ?5 ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈 ∗ ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊   
(1) 
                                                            
18 As for the hardware installed base, the software installed base for Game Boy and Game Gear is not directly 
available in our dataset. We therefore assume that the number of software titles sold per console in the years 
prior to the beginning of our dataset equals the number of software titles sold for each console in 1995. 
19 We set this variable to zero if there is no active parent generation. 14 
 
The first part of the utility function represents the baseline model that does not consider backward 
compatibility: utility depends on observed product characteristics ???, the console price 𝑝??, software 
variety ?𝑔?
20,  unobserved  characteristics 𝜉??,  and  the  idiosyncratic  error  term ???? ,  which  can  be 
interpreted as the difference of consumer ?’s valuation and the mean utility. 
This  model  is  extended  to  capture  the  effects  of  backward  compatibility.  First,  the  installed 
base ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊   of  the  prior  generation’s  compatible  games  is  added.  This  variable  is  used  to  test 
Hypothesis D.1 and we expect it to have a positive influence on the  buyer’s selection decision. 
Second, we add console age ??? as well as an interaction term of installed base and console age, 
??? ∗ ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 . For console age, we expect a negative influence as older consoles are less attractive to 
the remaining non-adopters. From Hypothesis D.2 we also expect a negative  coefficient for the 
interaction term between console age and installed base. Third, we add the improvement factor 
over the compatible parent ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈  and its interaction with installed base ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈 ∗ ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 . 
The improvement factor expresses the relative increase in CPU speed compared to the CPU speed of 
the earlier generation. We expect ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈  to have a positive effect on utility as a technological 
leap stimulates demand for a new product generation. In line with Hypothesis D.3 however, we 
expect the interaction term to have a negative effect on the buyer’s utility. 
As in Clements and Ohashi (2005), we assume ???? to be identically and independently distributed 
with an extreme value distribution function to generate a nested logit model (Berry 1994). Potential 
adopters decide first to buy a handheld game console or not and if they decide to buy one they then 
select a specific console. In contrast to a simple logit model, substitution patterns can therefore 
differ between the decision of buying a console and the decision which console to buy. 
Setting the outside good’s utility to zero (Berry 1994), we derive a linear regression equation: 
  ln ???  − ln ?0?  = ???? + ?𝑝?? + 𝜔?𝑔? + 𝜉?? + σln ???|? ? =1  + 
                                     + ?1??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 + ?2??? + ?3  ??? ∗ ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊   + 
                                     +?4??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1 + ?5 ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈 ∗ ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊   
(2) 
                                                            
20 As noted in section 4.1, we distinguish between consoles ? and platforms 𝑔 which can consist of multiple 




We follow the existing literature when estimating software supply (Clements and Ohashi 2005, Corts 
and  Lederman  2009).  Software  supply  is  expressed  by  the  variety  of  different  game  titles  ?𝑔? 
available for a specific platform. We estimate the following reduced-form equation: 
  ?𝑔? = ?? + ?1??𝑔?
?𝑊 + ?2?𝑔? + ?3 ?𝑔? ∗ ??𝑔?
?𝑊  + 𝜂𝑔? + 
            +?4??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 + ?4 ?𝑔? ∗ ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊   + ?5??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈 + ?6 ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈 ∗ ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊    (3) 
The first line of the equation is the base model with ?? being brand-specific dummies, ??𝑔?
?𝑊 the 
installed base of console of the current generation, ?𝑔? the age of the platform, and 𝜂𝑔? an error 
term. We allow hardware installed base to interact with platform age (Clements and Ohashi 2005). 
We  extend  the  model  with  the  same  measures  of  backward  compatibility  as  for  the  demand 
estimation. Following Hypothesis S.1, we expect ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  to negatively affect software supply as the 
installed base of backward compatible software might partly substitute for demand for new game 
titles. Further, from Hypotheses S.2 and S.3 we expect the interaction term of ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  with platform 
age and relative performance increase respectively to be positive as they reduce the importance of 
backward compatibility on the demand side and we therefore expect less substitution. 
4.3.  Instruments 
Hardware demand 
The  potential  endogeneity  of  the  three  variables  within-group  share ???|? ? =1,  price 𝑝??,  and 
software  variety  ?𝑔?  requires  the  identification  of  appropriate  instruments.  We  use  the  set  of 
instruments proposed by Clements and Ohashi (2005) and Corts and Lederman (2009). Within-group 
share is obviously correlated with the error term 𝜉?? as it contains part of the dependent variable ???. 
As 𝜉?? is known to firms and consumers in the market (but not to the econometrician), differences in 
unobserved quality might lead to different price setting and thus a correlation of the console price 
𝑝??  and 𝜉??.  Finally,  autocorrelation  of  𝜉??  leads  to  a  positive  correlation  between  𝜉??  and  the 
measure of software variety ?𝑔?. 
First, we use exchange rates between the US and Japan as a cost side instrument for prices as many 
consoles come from Japan. Exchange rates seem a valid price instrument as their change would 
probably lead to price adjustment in the US market. However,  it does not allow for identifying 
effects at the console level. 16 
 
Further, we use the average age of software titles currently available on the market to instrument 
for within-group share and console price. A high average age of games is a sign for missing supply of 
new game titles. Hence, we expect negative correlations of average software age both with within-
group share as a lack of new games reduces the console’s relative attractiveness and with console 
price as console manufacturers may try to reduce counter this adverse effect by lowering prices. 
Finally,  we  construct  several  instruments  that  measure  the  extent  of  competition  faced  by  a 
platform (Berry et al. 1995). We use the sum of competing hardware characteristics
21, the total 
number of competing platforms, the number of competing platforms within a company, and the 
number of competing platforms within the same generation  as instruments. Following Corts and 
Lederman  (2009),  these  instruments  are  expected  to  be  correlated  with  each  of  the  three 
endogenous variables: with the within-group share as  they affect utility  of different options, with 
software variety as they influence incentives to provide game titles, and with price as they affect the 
ability to raise prices. 
Software supply 
The installed base of hardware ??𝑔?
?𝑊 is possibly endogenous as unobserved shocks in the software 
market might lead to increased software entry but also to increased hardware adoption. We use the 
instruments proposed by Clements and Ohashi (2005) to account for endogeneity. The average age 
of software titles on the market can be used as an instrument, although the direction in which the 
instrument  works  is  not  clear.  A  high  average  software  age  could  either  indicate  profitable 
opportunities or tough competition. We also use  squared platform age and an interaction term 
between platform age and average software age as supply-side instruments. 
5. Results 
The  2SLS  estimation  results  are  reported  in  Table  4  (hardware  demand)  and  Table  5  (software 
supply). The corresponding OLS regression results can be found in Table A. 1 and Table A. 2. Columns 
4-1 and 5-1 report results without the software installed base, 4-2 and 5-2 include just the linear 
term of the software installed base, and 4-3 and 5-3 include both the interaction terms and the 
hardware  improvement  factor.  In  all  specifications,  we  use  brand  dummies  to  control  for 
unobserved brand-specific effects as well as calendar month dummies to control for the strong 
seasonality  in  console  sales.  All  2SLS  estimations  are  robust  to  arbitrary  heteroskedasticity  and 
arbitrary autocorrelation. 
                                                            
21 We use the sums of the competing consoles’ cumulative CPU speed and weight. 17 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
We discuss our results in the order of our hypotheses, i.e. we consider both the demand and the 
supply side and discuss the respective influence of backward compatibility in general in section 5.1, 
over time in section 5.2, and depending on technological progress in section 5.3.  
All important control variables in the instrumented estimation results have the expected signs over 
the different specifications. Higher CPU speed increases demand, whereas higher console weight 
decreases  demand.  The  industry  exhibits  indirect  network  effects  as  the  availability  of  more 
software variety ? ?? positively influences demand and the availability of a larger hardware installed 
base in turn increases software variety. Further, we find negative price elasticity of demand and a 
strong positive seasonal effect (not reported) in November and December for both demand and 
supply.
22 These results give us confidence in our model specification.  
5.1.  Effect of backward compatibility on demand and supply 
We now discuss the first-order effect of backward compatibility on demand and supply. As outlined 
in section 3.1, we expect backward compatibility to work through the installed base ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  of games 
for the parent generation. 
Hardware Demand 
We first observe that ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  has a significantly positive coefficient for both specifications (4-2) and 
(4-3), which supports Hypothesis D.1. For specification (4-3), we compare the effect of backward 
compatibility with indirect network effects from software variety ?𝑔?: one extra game title for the 
current  generation  has  the  same  impact  on  demand  as  75,694  game  titles  sold  for  the  parent 
generation
23. Applying this to the case of the  Game Boy Advance, at the launch in June 2001 an 
                                                            
22 As the right-hand side of the demand model is the mean utility of console ? in month ?, the magnitudes of 
the coefficients for the demand model cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way (Corts and Lederman, 2009). 
We therefore either compare the strengths of different effects or discuss marginal effects from exogenous 
changes of a console’s backward compatibility. 
23 The average unit sales of games in our sample are 118,619. 18 
 
installed base of 45.6 million compatible Game Boy Color games corresponded to the availability of 
602 game titles for the new generation. In fact, at launch only 21 game titles were available for the 
Game Boy Advance and it took until October 2004 for 602 game titles to be released. 
Software Supply 
Adding ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  to the baseline specification as in estimation (5-2), we do not see any significant 
effect from backward compatibility. However, in the full specification (5-3), we obtain a significant 
negative effect of ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  on software variety
24. For each million units of installed base, 1.22 game 
titles less would be offered on the market. Again looking at the example of the Game Boy Advance, 
the installed base of 45.6 million compatible Game Boy Color games would reduce software supply 
by 56 titles at its launch date. This implies that absent an installed base, there would have 76 games 
available immediately from the launch of the Game Boy Advance. 
5.2.  Importance of backward compatibility over time 
In our second pair of hypotheses, we argued that the influence of backward compatibility declines 
over  time  as  more  games  for  the  current  generation  become  available.  Therefore,  we  add  an 
interaction term between platform age and the size of the installed base. 
Hardware Demand 
The  significant  and  negative  sign  of  the  interaction  term  ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ???  supports  Hypothesis  D.2. 
Combining the effects of the installed base with the interaction term for specification (4-3), we see 
that backward compatibility has a positive effect for 47 months. Although this exceeds the lifecycle 
of most consoles, it is clear that the benefits of backward compatibility decrease over time. 
In the related industry of video game consoles, the changing importance of backward compatibility 
over time can be observed for the case of Sony’s Playstation 3. The first models of the Playstation 3 
launched  in  November  2006  were  made  fully  compatible  with  the  Playstation  2  by  additionally 
including CPU and graphics processor from the Playstation 2. The next models, launched in March 
and August 2007, only offered limited backward compatibility as the Playstation 2 CPU was removed 
and replaced by a software emulator. Finally, all new models that appeared afterwards offer no 
backward compatibility at all as now even the graphic processor of the Playstation 2 was removed
25. 
                                                            
24 This is intuitive as we find a time-varying effect in (5-3), suggesting that a simple linear term is misspecified. 
Indeed, we find strong serial correlation in the error term in specification (5-1). 




Even though the interaction term ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ?𝑔? is positive at the 5% significance level for the OLS 
specification (A2-3), the coefficient in our 2SLS specification (5-3) is not significant. We therefore do 
not  find  support  for  Hypothesis  S.2,  suggesting  that  the  supply-decreasing  effect  of  backward 
compatibility  on  games  does  not  change  over  time  although  of  course  it  becomes  much  less 
important compared to the large (and growing) number of new-generation games.  
5.3.  Backward compatibility and technological progress 
In  the  last  part  of  our  analysis  we  include  an  interaction  term  between  installed  base  and 
technological progress. 
Hardware Demand 
Our results support Hypothesis D.3, as the interaction term has a significantly negative coefficient. 
Trading  off  the  counteracting  effects  of  the  installed  base  against  the  interaction  term  for 
specification  (4-3),  we  see  that  backward  compatibility  has  a  positive  effect  if  the  percentage 
increase in CPU speed compared to the compatible parent generation is smaller than 359%. The 
largest technological leap between two succeeding generations in our data set is the switch from the 
Game Boy Advance SP to the Nintendo DS. For this generation change, CPU speed increased from 
16.7 MHz to 67 MHz, which is an increase by 301%. Here, backward compatibility only played a 
strongly  reduced  (although  still  positive)  role.  This  coincides  with  the  observation  that  the 
Playstation Portable, which entered the market only four months later, was the only console to 
successfully challenge Nintendo’s dominance in the market for handheld game consoles – with a 
much improved technology and up against a less influential installed base. 
Software Supply 
The  results  from  specification  (5-3)  strongly  support  Hypothesis  S.3  that  higher  technological 
progress between generations reduces the supply-decreasing effect of backward compatibility. We 
see a substitutive effect from backward compatibility as long as the technological leap is smaller 
than 239%. Therefore, the Nintendo DS with an increase in CPU speed of 301% more than outweighs 
the substitutive effect. 
6. Backward Compatibility to Sustain Dominance 
Our results suggest a strong effect of backward compatibility on the demand of new hardware 
generations. Since Nintendo is the only firm to launch successive console generations and therefore 
the only firm to report a positive installed base of backward compatible games, we ask if backward 20 
 
compatibility was a useful means of sustaining a dominant market position over multiple product 
generations. To isolate this effect however, we need to rule out that backward compatibility simply 
proxies for other unobserved factors – the Nintendo effect. We address this in two ways: First, we 
discuss  the  brand  dummies  in  our  regressions  that  aim  to  capture  unobserved,  brand-specific 
factors. Second, we run a counterfactual experiment by assigning one of the unsuccessful consoles, 
the Game.com console, the installed base of the then dominant console, the Game Boy.  
6.1.  The Nintendo Effect 
Table  6  reports  the  brand  dummies  for  all  players  in  the  handheld  game  console  market,  with 
Nintendo the base category.  
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
While Sony’s brand dummy has a positive and significant sign – suggesting that both brand equity 
and technological advance played a role in successfully challenging Nintendo, the other dummies 
show no  clear  pattern.  This  implies  that Nintendo’s  reputation does not significantly explain its 
success in repeatedly holding off competition. One explanation for Sony’s success (and the others’ 
failure) would be that Nintendo’s reputation suffered significantly just prior to the introduction of 
the PSP, which would lead to a significant and positive brand dummy for Sony as it measures the 
reputation relative to Nintendo. However, there is no anecdotal evidence for this in the relevant 
time period. 
Another  consideration  is  that  Nintendo’s  reputation  may  have  grown  over  time  and  that  the 
backward compatible installed base (which grew more or less constantly throughout our sample) 
simply proxies for this reputation increase rather than a “real” effect of backward compatibility. 
However, as the Sony PSP entered at the very end of the sample, this would make its success all the 
more improbable as it would have to be based on an implausibly high brand reputation vis-à-vis 
Nintendo. However, to alleviate this possible bias, we run our preferred regressions (4-3 and 5-3) 
using the rolling software installed base ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  of the three years before the observation month 
instead of the overall installed base. The results are shown in Table 7 and show a qualitatively similar 
picture as our baseline results, ruling out this alternative explanation. 21 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
6.2.  A Counterfactual Experiment 
To  assess  if  backward  compatibility  could  indeed  have  played  a  role  in  sustaining  Nintendo’s 
advantage by intensifying the startup problem for challenging platforms, we run a counterfactual 
experiment in which we hypothetically assume that games for the Game Boy generation can be 
played on the Game.com console (and Nintendo consoles).
26 In reality, the Game.com console was 
not backward compatible to any other parent console and was a commercial failure. Following Corts 
and Lederman (2009), we derive the counterfactual as follows. First, mean utility ??? for console ? at 
time ? is derived from the regression results of our preferred specification (4-3). With the nested 
logit formula discussed in Berry (1994), the implied market shares can be obtained as follows: 
 
??? =
exp ???  1 − 𝜎     
?𝜎 1 + ?1−𝜎 
 
(4) 
with ? ≡   exp ???  1 − 𝜎      ? . In a next step, we assume that the Game.com console, which was 
launched in 9/1997 could have played titles for the Game Boy. The installed base of compatible 
software titles for the parent generation ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 , the performance increase of the Game.com CPU 
compared  to  the  Game  Boy  CPU ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈 ,  and  the  interaction  terms  from  equation  (2)  are 
adjusted accordingly. We then use the updated values to recalculate mean utilities and implied 
market shares. We repeat these steps for every month in the first year since the launch of the 
Game.com console and report average changes and the actual outcome in the top half of Table 8. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
First off, we observe that backward compatibility leads to an increase in total demand: the average 
additional demand of 217,541 Game.com units is nearly twice as large as the average decrease in 
demand  for  the  competing  platforms  of  109,646  units.  Without  backward  compatibility,  the 
technologically superior Game.com never takes off and the outdated Game Boy Pocket maintains a 
dominant position, as can be seen from Game.com’s actual market share of 2.68%. Assigning the 
                                                            
26 Such a move of mandating compatibility with a promising entrant could also be imposed by an antitrust 
authority as a pro-competitive measure ((Shapiro 1996)). 22 
 
Game  Boy’s  installed  base  to  Game.com  changes  the  dynamics  of  the  market  drastically,  and 
Game.com’s counterfactual market share is almost as high as Nintendo’s actual one.
27  
In the bottom part of Table 8, we add the indirect effect of backward compatibility, which we found 
to decrease supply of new games. We proceed as follows. We first simulate backward compatibility 
of the Game.com console by changing the installed bases analogous to hardware demand. We then 
use the coefficients from our supply estimation (5-3) to predict the number of available games ?𝑔?. 
We  finally  substitute  this  (lower)  number  of  available  games  in  the  utility  function  ???  of  the 
demand-side equation and can again derive implied changes in units sold and in market shares. 
The indirect effect moderates the direct effect somewhat (as game providers for Game.com would 
have  been  deterred  by  the  installed  base  of  backward  compatible  games  serving  as  imperfect 
substitutes). However, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, so that backward compatibility 
would still have helped the Game.com console capture a large chunk of the market at the time. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we study the effects of backward compatibility in a market with indirect network 
effects, the US handheld game console industry. Backward compatibility helped the market leader 
Nintendo maintain their dominant position over a number of product generations despite having an 
inferior technology in many instances. Backward compatibility in this market works through the 
installed base of games for a compatible parent generation and its strength is affected by the age of 
the console and the degree of technological improvement between successive generations. 
On  the  demand  side,  our  results  lend  support  to  the  role  of  backward  compatibility.  If  a  new 
generation  is  backward  compatible  with  the  old  one,  the  installed  base  of  games  for  the  prior 
generation increases sales for the new generation console. However, this demand-increasing effect 
is strongest directly after product introduction and declines over time as more games specifically for 
the new generation appear. Finally, large technological improvements across generations come at 
the  cost  of  consumers  valuing  backward  compatibility  less  as  their  utility  from  using  the  old 
complementary  products  is  comparatively  low.  Therefore,  benefits  from  large  technological 
improvement  are  partially  offset  by  the  reduced  benefits  from  backward  compatibility.  On  the 
supply side, we find that backward compatibility lowers the supply of new software, and that this 
effect is less pronounced for consoles with higher technological progress.  
                                                            
27 Note that we maintain Game Boy’s backward compatibility so that Game Boy and Game.com have equal 
installed bases. 23 
 
By jointly analyzing hardware demand and software supply, we identify a tradeoff between the 
demand-enhancing effect of backward compatibility directly affecting hardware demand and the 
demand-reducing effect that works indirectly through reduced software variety for a platform. We 
find that the demand-increasing effect clearly outweighs the demand-decreasing effect. 
We  discuss  if  backward  compatibility  may  have  stabilized  market  structure  in  the  US  handheld 
console market by giving Nintendo a head start for every new generation, making it difficult for 
challengers to enter successfully. Sony’s PSP, the most successful challenger, entered with a much 
superior technology at a time when Nintendo had just made a significant technological leap from 
their previous generation, which is in line with our results that backward compatibility matters less if 
the  generations  are  very  different  technologically,  so  that  Nintendo  was  comparably  more 
vulnerable at that junction. To further substantiate the claim that backward compatibility helped 
Nintendo  maintain  a  dominant  position  over  technologically  superior  challengers,  we  run  a 
counterfactual  experiment  and  assign  Nintendo’s  Game  Boy  installed  base  to  a  technologically 
superior, but ultimately unsuccessful challenger, the Game.com console. We find that if Game.com 
had been backward compatible, market dominance would have been reversed. 
Our findings illustrate the dynamic effects of backward compatibility and emphasize the importance 
of backward compatibility in maintaining a dominant position across several product generations. 
While  backward  compatibility  indeed  helps  overcoming  the  startup  problem,  its  importance 
decreases over time. Also, for generation changes with large technological improvements, backward 
compatibility will be a less successful strategy to sustain market dominance across generations. 
Our results  have both managerial and policy implications. Managers in network industries must 
consider backward compatibility an important parameter that helps stabilize market shares across 
generations  and  establish  persistent  dominance.  Judiciously  managing  the  tradeoff  between 
backward compatibility and technological progress is thus a key challenge for technology strategists. 
Conversely,  antitrust  authorities  may  consider  scenarios  of  asymmetric  backward  compatibility 
anticompetitive since they may prevent large-scale entry by technologically superior challengers and 
thus hinder the process of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942).  24 
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Figures and tables 
 
Table 1: Mobile handheld consoles sold between 1995 and 2007 
Console  Platform  Backward  U.S. launch   Manufacturer  Hardware 




Generation IV             




Nintendo  4.2 
300 
  Game Boy Pocket  9/1996  148 
  Game Gear  Game Gear  No  1/1991  Sega  3.6  500 
Generation V             
  Game Boy Color  GB Color  Yes  11/1998  Nintendo  8.4  188 
  Virtual Boy  Virtual Boy  No  8/1995  Nintendo  20  760 
  game.com 
game.com  No 
9/1997 
Tiger  10 
380 
  game.com Pocket Pro  12/1999  n/a 
Generation VI             




Nintendo  16.7 
180 
  Game Boy Advance SP  3/2003  142 
  Neo Geo Pocket Color  NGP Color  No  8/1999  SNK  6.14  145 
  N-Gage 
N-Gage  No 
10/2003 
Nokia 
104  137 
  N-Gage QD  8/2004  104  143 
Generation VII             
  DS 
DS  Yes 
11/2004 
Nintendo  67 
275 
  DS Lite  6/2006  218 




Sony  333 
280 
  Playstation Portable Slim  9/2007  189 
 
Table 2: Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
???  Market share of console j at time t (relative to market potential) 
?0?  Market share of the outside good (no console purchase) 
???|? ? =1  Within-group market share (share within the handheld market) 
? ??  Available software titles for current format 
𝑝??  Deflated console price (1995 prices) 
???
?𝑒?𝑔 ℎ?  Normalized weight of the console 
???
?𝑃𝑈  Normalized CPU speed of the console  
??𝑔?
?𝑊  Installed base of consoles for the current platform format (millions) 
??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊   Installed base of games for the compatible parent platform (millions) 
???  Age of the console (months) 
??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈   Percentage improvement of CPU to compatible parent platform 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
log ???/?0?    503  -8.69  2.09  -13.07  -4.68 
log ???|? ? =1   503  -2.33  1.96  -7.74  0      
? ??  503  257.91  233.72  2        844      
𝑝??  503  76.39  41.77  8.50  238.16 
???
?𝑒?𝑔 ℎ?  501  0  1        -1.57  3.52 
???
?𝑃𝑈  503  0  1        -1.44  3.25 
??𝑔?
?𝑊  503  11.66  10.42  0        34.42 
??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊   503  39.36  47.14  0        174.72 
???  503  35.07  30.70  0        131       
??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈   503  0.65  0.88  0        3.02 
 
Table 4: Hardware demand estimates (2SLS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln sjt  − ln s0t  
INDEPENDENT  (4-1)  (4-2)  (4-3) 
VARIABLES       
       
SW installed base ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  [millions]    0.0142***  0.0144** 
  (0.00110)  (0.00680) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ???      -0.000306*** 
    (0.0000953) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈       -0.00401*** 
    (0.00128) 
HW improvement ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈       0.862*** 
    (0.189) 
Number of available games ?𝑔?  0.00429***  0.000771**  0.00109** 
(0.000512)  (0.000301)  (0.000499) 
Deflated price 𝑝??  -0.00947*  -0.0102***  -0.00815** 
(0.00547)  (0.00318)  (0.00410) 
ln(within-group share ???|? ? =1)  0.781***  0.738***  0.654*** 
(0.116)  (0.0638)  (0.0950) 
Console age ???  -0.0228***  -0.0105***  -0.00485** 
(0.00397)  (0.00230)  (0.00232) 
Normalized console weight ???
?𝑒?𝑔 ℎ?  0.217  -0.252***  -0.324*** 
(0.145)  (0.0914)  (0.104) 
Normalized CPU speed ???
?𝑃𝑈  0.170  0.159**  0.165* 
(0.114)  (0.0682)  (0.0854) 
Observations  501  501  501 
R-squared  0.869  0.954  0.958 
Hansen’s J  8.950  34.47  33.68 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation. Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are not reported. 
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Table 5: Software supply estimates (2SLS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Ngt 
INDEPENDENT  (5-1)  (5-2)  (5-3) 
VARIABLES       
       
SW installed base ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  [millions]    -0.107  -1.220*** 
  (0.0830)  (0.283) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ?𝑔?      -0.00106 
    (0.00382) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈       0.510*** 
    (0.0608) 
HW improvement ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈       -22.02* 
    (12.09) 
HW installed base ??𝑔?
?𝑊  34.56***  35.08***  38.14*** 
(0.565)  (0.591)  (1.200) 
Interaction term ??𝑔?
?𝑊 ∗ ?𝑔?  -0.133***  -0.139***  -0.149*** 
(0.0104)  (0.0104)  (0.0128) 
Format age ?𝑔?  -1.539***  -1.564***  -2.115*** 
(0.155)  (0.157)  (0.117) 
Observations  417  417  417 
R-squared  0.979  0.979  0.983 
Hansen’s J  13.26  11.29  18.35 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation. Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are not reported. 
 
Table 6: Omitted brand dummies from estimation (4-3) 
BRAND   
Sega  0.565** 
  (0.239) 
Tiger  -0.747*** 
  (0.231) 
SNK  0.165 
  (0.390) 
Nokia  0.194 
  (0.718) 
Sony  2.781*** 
  (0.303) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7a: Hardware demand estimates (2SLS) for a 3-year rolling window of  𝑰𝑩??−𝛏,??
𝑺𝑾   
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln sjt  − ln s0t  
INDEPENDENT  (7-a) 
VARIABLES   
   
SW installed base ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  [millions]  0.0156*** 
(0.00478) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?




?𝑃𝑈   -0.00878*** 
(0.00317) 
HW improvement ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈   1.255*** 
(0.290) 
Number of available games ?𝑔?  0.000268 
(0.000662) 
Deflated price 𝑝??  -0.00625 
(0.00421) 
ln(within-group share ???|? ? =1)  0.641*** 
(0.0869) 
Console age ???  -0.00559** 
(0.00226) 
Normalized console weight ???
?𝑒?𝑔 ℎ?  -0.357*** 
(0.108) 
Normalized CPU speed ???
?𝑃𝑈  0.0831 
(0.0905) 
Observations  501 
R-squared  0.954 
Hansen’s J  30.86 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation. Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are not reported. 
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Table 7b: Software supply estimates (2SLS) for a 3-year rolling window of  𝑰𝑩??−𝛏,??
𝑺𝑾  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Ngt 
INDEPENDENT  (7-b) 
VARIABLES   
   
SW installed base ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  [millions]  -0.710** 
(0.312) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?




?𝑃𝑈   0.838*** 
(0.125) 
HW improvement ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈   -67.11*** 
(16.02) 
HW installed base ??𝑔?
?𝑊  37.51*** 
(1.024) 
Interaction term ??𝑔?
?𝑊 ∗ ?𝑔?  -0.147*** 
(0.0111) 
Format age ?𝑔?  -2.024*** 
(0.139) 
Observations  417 
R-squared  0.982 
Hansen’s J  3.568 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation. Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are not reported. 
 
Table  8:  Average  monthly  changes  (9/1997-8/1998)  assuming  that  the  Game.com  console  is  backward 
compatible with software for the Game Boy 
  Game.com  Game  Boy 
Pocket 
Virtual Boy
28  Game Gear 
Actual market shares  2.68%  89.03%  5.64%  4.84% 
Predicted market shares base model  2.91%  74.50%  12.29%  10.66% 
Direct effect of backward compatibility         
Unit change prediction vs. counterfactual  +217,541  -79,371  -18,255  -12,020 
Market share change prediction vs. 
counterfactual 
+69.38%  -53.46%  -8.50%  -7.63% 
Indirect effect of backward compatibility         
Additional unit change  -13,744  +3,723  +612  +544 
Additional market share change  -3.08%  +2.46%  +0.29%  +0.35% 
 
                                                            
28  Nintendo‘s  Virtual  Boy  has  only  been  on  the  market  for  the  first  six  months  since  the  launch  of  the 
Game.com console. 31 
 
 
Figure 1: Monthly market shares from 1995 to 2007 
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Date
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GAME.COM GAME.COM POCKET PRO
LYNX 2 N-GAGE
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Table A. 1: Hardware demand estimates (OLS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ln sjt  − ln s0t  
INDEPENDENT  (A1-1)  (A1-2)  (A1-3) 
VARIABLES       
       
SW installed base ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  [millions]    0.0126***  0.00967*** 
  (0.000664)  (0.00180) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ???      -0.000124*** 
    (2.78e-05) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈       -0.00336*** 
    (0.000418) 
HW improvement ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈       0.00967*** 
    (0.00180) 
Number of available games ?𝑔?  0.00186***  0.000789***  -0.000124*** 
(0.000136)  (0.000117)  (2.78e-05) 
Deflated price 𝑝??  0.000310  -0.00483***  -0.00475*** 
(0.00115)  (0.000844)  (0.000924) 
ln(within-group share ???|? ? =1)  0.972***  0.924***  0.888*** 
(0.0198)  (0.0158)  (0.0172) 
Console age ???  -0.00820***  -0.00226*  -0.000521 
(0.00147)  (0.00116)  (0.00124) 
Normalized console weight ???
?𝑒?𝑔 ℎ?  0.246***  -0.0495  -0.0664** 
(0.0393)  (0.0376)  (0.0337) 
Normalized CPU speed ???
?𝑃𝑈  -0.207***  0.0247  0.0421 
(0.0484)  (0.0412)  (0.0428) 
Observations  501  501  501 
R-squared  0.939  0.970  0.974 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are not reported. 
   33 
 
Table A. 2: Software supply estimates (OLS) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Ngt 
INDEPENDENT  (A2-1)  (A2-2)  (A2-3) 
VARIABLES       
       
SW installed base ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊  [millions]    -0.00178  -1.028*** 
  (0.0592)  (0.196) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ?𝑔?      0.00581** 
    (0.00283) 
Interaction term ??𝑔−1,?
?𝑊 ∗ ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈       0.390*** 
    (0.0466) 
HW improvement ??𝑃?𝑔,𝑔−1
?𝑃𝑈       -17.49* 
    (9.520) 
HW installed base ??𝑔?
?𝑊  32.98***  32.99***  35.19*** 
(0.339)  (0.351)  (0.667) 
Interaction term ??𝑔?
?𝑊 ∗ ?𝑔?  -0.110***  -0.110***  -0.127*** 
(0.00692)  (0.00688)  (0.00756) 
Platform age ?𝑔?  -1.757***  -1.757***  -2.053*** 
(0.112)  (0.116)  (0.101) 
Observations  417  417  417 
R-squared  0.980  0.980  0.984 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Brand dummies, calendar month dummies, and constant are not reported. 
 